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PREFACE
This paper was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel (OASD (FM&P)), under contract MDA 903 89 C 0003, Task Order T-L7-798, issued 15 March 1990. The objective of the task was to identify promising approaches to maintaining strong military manpower capability during a period of declining budgets and force levels. This is one of a total of seven papers to be published. Each of the seven papers covers a specific area of military manpower management: the proper experience mix, personnel movement, the timing of training, lateral entry, the link between career progression and assumption of management responsibilities, individual training methods, and increased use of simulators for training. The topic of this paper is personnel movement. 
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Policies governing the geographic movement of U.S. military personnel are a topic of ongoing concern within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the uniformed services, and the Congress. Congressional interest in this topic derives primarily from the cost of personnel movement-in FY 1989 Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves cost $2.5 billion. Cost, hcwvever, is not the only issue; more frequent movement of personnel may impose a number of indirect costs such as degraded unit effectiveness. Yet policies that attempt to reduce movement might impose their own problems, such as less exposure to a variety of experiences and command opportunities. Although a number of studies have examined pieces of the problem (see References [1] through [4] , for example), there exists no single, comprehensive discussion of DoD policies governing personnel movement and analysis of whether alternative policies might (in some sense) be better.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a start at such a discussion by: (1) documenting the current policies that govern personnel movement and how they came to be; (2) examining existing evidence regarding the links between the frequency of personnel movement and other factors, including personnel productivity, unit effectiveness, and retention; (3) investigating in what ways current policies might be changed and what the benefits (and costs) of such changes might be; and (4) determining areas where further analysis might bear fruit.
Our review of the existing evidence suggests that significant benefits would in fact accrue to reduced personnel movement and increased unit stability. However, the cost of gaining these benefits depends upon how reduced movement is implemented. The frequency of personnel movement is high primarily because of the large number of U.S.
forces stationed abroad and at sea. The return of a large portion of U.S. forces stationed in Europe and elsewhere would enable the services, particularly the Army, to simultaneously increase tour lengths and reduce unit turbulence. It has the further advantage of reducing PCS costs. In addition, other benefits would accrue. One example is that the move to a larger force based in the continental United States (CONUS) would allow the Army to expand its Cohesion, Operations, Readiness, and Training (COHORT) system of I I personnel replacement, a system which has certain advantages over the individual 3 replacement system.
Unfortunately, in the absence of the return of a large portion of the U.S. forces stationed abroad, policy options for reducing personnel movement are rather limited and more costly. Given the current billet structure, reducing movement without adversely 3 impacting morale and retention requires inducing personnel to voluntarily accept longer tours through improved compensation. The evidence is not entirely clear about whether there would be a net benefit to expanded use of compensation to reduce personnel movement; however, the Navy's experience with the expanded sea pay during the 1980s is encouraging.
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The analysis herein points up several areas that require further study. One is how to plan for the move to a larger CONUS-based force and identification of problems that will I inevitably arise during the transition period. Second, the link between the move to a larger CONUS-based force and expanded use of alternative manning systems like the Army's
COHORT system also deserves more attention. Third, uncertainty regarding available evidence about the effects of compensation on voluntary extensions to overseas or sea duty U requires that this area be studied further, something that could be done with available data. The primary factor that determines personnel movement is the services' requirement to fill "spaces" or "billets." The need to move personnel to fill these spaces depends on a number of factors, the most important of which are the number of U.S. military installations and personnel turnover-separations and retirements. The larger the number of U.S. military installations, either within or outside of CONUS, the greater will be the need to move personnel to fill vacant spaces. A reduction in U.S. forces in the NATO countries would have dramatic effects on personnel movement, particularly in the Army and Air Force. A higher separation rate generates more vacant spaces and more movements to fill them.
Factors such as the geographic dispersion of military installations and personnel turnover rates are, to some extent, exogenous" determinants of personnel movement, i.e., determinants that are not immediately controllable by assignment policy. These factors give rise to a minimum below which movement is difficult to reduce. But as is explored in more detail below, much movement is policy-driven; in many instances the services have implemented policies aimed at reducing personnel movement, while in other instances they have implemented policies whose effect is to increase movement. DoD currently recognizes six categories of moves: operational, rotational, training, unit, accession, and separation. Operational moves are moves from one CONUS space to another or from one overseas location to another that do not involve moves to or from CONUS military training establishments. Rotational moves are those from CONUS to overseas locations (excluding moves originating from CONUS training establishments) or moves from overseas locations back to CONUS. Training moves are moves to or from CONUS training establishments for periods of 20 weeks or more (except moves originating overseas). Training moves are those beyond the initial skill level. Accession moves include those to the basic training establishments and from there to initial assignments. Unit moves are movements of organized military units arising from such I factors as (nc..-4DY) unit deployments or geographic reassignment of the unit. Separation moves are self-explanatory.
The various categories of moves are interdependent. More separations may 3 necessitate not only more accession moves, but also more training, operational, and rotational moves. But if it is unacceptable to military personnel, a policy that tries to reduce rotational or operational moves may ultimately cause an increase in separations, and moves due to separation and accession may therefore increase. A host of non-PCS policieswhere to locate the training establishments, when to train personnel, the level of reenlistment bonuses or retirement benefits, etc.-affect movement. 
B. DATA ON MOVEMENT FREQUENCY AND COSTS
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Perhaps a more useful statistic to examine is the number of moves relative to the force level. These patterns are revealing. After a number of moves in the first year related to training, personnel tend to move less than one time in the next 4 years of service. That is, there appears to be an initial period of stability in geographic location. Thereafter, however, the frequency appears to pick up again. Between 5 and 10 years of service, for example, Army officers move an additional 2.4 times, implying an average of about two years at each location. Between 10 and 15 years, the average length of stay is also about 2 years. Among enlisted personnel, the differences across services are minimal until 10 YOS. Among officers, Marine Corps officers appear to move the most and Air Force officers move the least. DoD policy attempts to reduce personnel movement by permitting individuals to extend beyond the prescribed tour in their current billets wherever possible, particularly those serving in overseas locations. This implies that the services are free to involuntarily reassign personnel only if a vacancy exists for which they qualify and no volunteers can be U found to fill the vacancy.
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When other factors are not overriding, PCS costs are supposed to be given n "reasonable consideration" in deciding who to move.
b. Tour Lengths
With regard to establishing tour lengths, a major determinant of PCS costs, the 3 guiding principle behind DoD Directive 1315.7 is fairness or equity, especially with respect to assignments overseas. Personnel should not be assigned to inordinately long tours in 3 undesirable locations and everyone should share the burden of serving at undesirable locations at one time or another. To achieve equity, the directive establishes a norm of 36 The policy directive permits a number of deviations from these standard tour lengths. For one, because the Navy could not adhere to the DoD directive and fill its sea billets, Navy personnel in sea-intensive ratings are exempted from the standard 3-year CONUS tour. For another, managers of major weapon systems acquisition programs are assigned to the program for either a minimum of 4 years or the completion of a major program milestone. Another exception is that assignment of general officers is normally for a period of 2 years; furthermore, assignments of general officers are not otherwise bound by the DoD directive. Finally, the directive specifies a number of circumstances under which other deviations from the usual tour lengths are permitted, including such factors as base closure, unit deactivation, and organizational changes.
Service Policies
The language in the services' policy directives is patterned after the basic DoD standard. Although they appear to adhere to DoD Directive 1315.7, they may spell out more specifically the criteria for reassignment or deal with service-specific issues. Officer assignment policy is set forth in AR 614-100 and AR 614-185 (References 
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The lengths of time Navy enlisted personnel are assigned to sea and shore billets varies by rating. Nominally, Navy policy is to achieve a sea-shore rotation ratio of 3:3 in all enlisted ratings (e.g., 3 years of sea duty for each 3 years of shore duty). However,
this policy is in practice not achievable. In the majority of Navy ratings, the ratio of sea to shore billets is in excess of 1:1. The Navy-wide average for paygrades E-5 and above is about 3.8:3. Many Navy ratings are now classified as "deprived" (sea-shore billet ratios of between 4:3 and 5:3) or "extremely deprived" (ratios above 5:3).
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D. POLICY HISTORY
The evolution of DoD PCS policies is described in some detail in Reference [11. Briefly, DoD Directive 1315.7 was first promulgated in 1957. Prior to that time, thc services set their own policies without guidance from DoD. Over the years, the DoD I directive has been modified six times-1958, 1963, 1974, 1977, 1985, and 1987-to arrive at the current set of policies. The 1958 directive called for standard tour lengths The 1974 version established a minimum 2-year tour in CONUS and increased some overseas accompanied tours to 48 months, an increase that was later reversed. A January 1977 version imposed a minimum 3-year tour for CONUS assignments and established new policies regarding the assignment of first-term personnel. After objections from the services, a new version promulgated in December of 1977 retained the minimum 3-year CONUS tour but permitted some exceptions (e.g., Navy personnel in sea-intensive ratings). It also set some new policies, including no more than one assignment for 3-year enlistees and two for 4-year enlistees, establishment of "homebasing" as a objective, and the minimum 2-year tour for general officers. The 1985 version changed tour lengths at 19 overseas locations, apparently in response to House Armed Services Committee inquiries into overseas tour lengths.
As noted earlier, DoD policy is to encourage personnel assigned overseas to extend their tours wherever possible. Several policies are designed to encourage voluntary extensions. One is the Overseas Tour Extension Incentive Program (OTEIP), which was first implemented in 1980. This program offers those who have successfully completed their assigned overseas tours the following incentives for a 1-year extension: (a) $960, (b) 30 days of paid leave, (c) 15 days paid leave and round-trip air fare to the nearest CONUS port of entry. Eligibility for OTEIP benefits is restricted to personnel serving in MOSs that have substantial overseas requirements. The Consecutive Overseas Tour (COT) program offers personnel currently serving overseas their choice of assignment if they move to another overseas billet. This program is potentially useful because it reduces the number of moves required to fill a vacancy (Reference [1] ).
E. TOUR LENGTH OUTCOMES
Having reviewed the policies governing tour lengths, it is useful to compare actual completed tour lengths (CTLs) with prescribed tour ler ,ths (PTLs). Such comparisons reveal the extent to which the services are adhering to DoD tour-length policies, and they also reveal some interesting differences across the services. To keep the comparisons manageable, we focus on those who were in enlisted paygrades E4-E6 or officer paygrades 04-06 and who had PTLs of 24 or 36 months. Data are also displayed by type of moveoperational (0) and rotational (R)-and by geographic origin of the move-CONUS, outside of CONUS. For each of these categories, Table 4 shows the average CTL for Source: Defense Manpower Data Center. a "0" stands for "operational" and "R" stands for "rotational."
Army personnel stationed in CONUS who are in grades E4-E6 and who are being moved for operational reasons served about 24 months in their previous assignment regardless of whether their PTL was 24 or 36 months. Likewise, similar personnel who were being moved for rotational reasons served about 29 months in their previous assignments, again regardless of whether their PTL was 24 or 36 months. Although it is 3 not surprising that Army personnel moved from CONUS for rotational reasons do not serve the notional 3-year CONUS tour prescribed by DoD policy, it is surprising that personnel rotated for operati(o reasons, which entail moves within CONUS, do not serve the full PTL. Similar statements may be made about overseas operational moves. The failure of personnel making operational moves to serve their full PTLs is a departure from DoD policy that may wan-ant further investigation.
Importantly, personnel stationed overseas who are moved for rotational reasons tend to complete their PTL prior to being moved. There is no problem on average of failure to complete prescribed overseas tour lengths.
Also note the differences across the services. Regardless of whether they were stationed in CONUS or overseas prior to the move, Air Force personnel tend, on average, to serve longer than their MTL. Navy tour lengths are generally shorter than the PTL.
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IH. POLICY ISSUES
Current PCS policies are the outgrowth of an evolutionary process. Discussions with those in DoD and the services who are responsible for PCS policy reveal a general satisfaction with current practices. The feeling seems to be that the PCS system "works," at least in the sense that it is well-understood and accepted, functions reasonably smoothly, and does not cause problems for other parts of the personnel system (e.g., personnel retention). Those policynakers have expressed a hesitation to implement major changes in policy for fear of the effect they would have on morale, retention, and other factors.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to ask whether the DoD moves people too frequently, and whether some policy changes could reduce personnel movement whose benefits would exceed their costs. In this section, we develop a simple framework for discussing the policy issues, and explore the issues and the empirical evidence regarding the links between the frequency of personnel movement and other factors, including productivity, career development, and morale and retention.
A. A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES
The following stylized (and highly simplified) model h'elps illustrate the relationships between the frequency of personnel movement, tour lengths, billet requirements, and other factors. 2 For simplicity, assume that there are three kinds of moves: rotational, accession, and separation. To model rotational moves, suppose that there are Nc CONUS billets and No overseas (or, in the case of the Navy, sea duty) billets to be filled. Let Fc be the number of personnel who move each year from CONUS to overseas and Fo be the number returning from overseas. Let tc and to denote the CONUS and overseas tour lengths, respectively. Assuming that all billets are filled, the numbers moving in a given year will be Fc = Nc/tc and Fo = Noto. The numbers moving vary inversely with tour lengths.
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In equilibrium, the numbers moving to and from overseas are equal; that is, Fc -Fo. From this we derive that the number of overseas billets is t C This equation can be viewed several ways. If there are Nc CONUS billets, the number of overseas billets that can be sustained is (to/t) Nc. Thus, a policy of equal CONUS and overseas tour lengths would require an equivalent number of CONUS and overseas billets.
If overseas tour lengths are twice the CONUS tour lengths, there needs to be only half as many CONUS billets as overseas billets.
The model suggests that a given billet structure can be sustained by an infinite number of alternative actual tour lengths; all that is required is that the billet ratio be equal to the ratio of tour lengths. Changing tour lengths changes the rotation flows Fc and Fo. 3 
This model could be modified to allow for differences in the billet requirements for and tour lengths of first-termers and careerists, but the qualitative implications would remain the n This model provides a framework for understanding the services' rotation policies and their accompanying problems. For instance, in many Navy ratings the bulk of the 3 billet requirements are aboard ship; that is, No/Nc exceeds one. The Navy's priority is the full manning of sea billets (NO). But the full manning of sea billets requires relatively long sea tours and relatively short shore tours; i.e., a high to/tc ratio. On the other hand, any I reduction in the length of sea tours (to) would require that the Navy provide more shore billets for those rotating from sea duty. Thus, the Navy's goal of a 3:3 rotation policy 3 would require a substantial increase in both the number of shore billets and the inventory of personnel in sea-intensive Navy ratings.
5
3 In reality, shortening tour lengths may increase total billet requirements by increasing the number of personnel in the transient account. 16 
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A similar problem exists in many Army MOSs. Thirty-six percent of Army enlisted perscnnel are stationed abroad, and personnel requirements in many Army MOSs exist mainly in Europe. 4 Any attempt to reduce tour lengths abroad would either require that the Army maintain a larger inventory of personnel in CONUS to provide an adequate rotation base or that it reduce CONUS tour lengths. 5 However, the severity of the Army's rotation problems will be dramatically reduced after the planned reduction of forces in Europe.
B. PRODUCTIVITY
One of the fundamental issues regarding the frequency of personnel movement is the effect that such movement has on military productivity and readiness. There are three related questions here. First, how does frequent movement affect an individual's performance on a particular assignment or in a particular billet? Second, given that so many military tasks are team-oriented, how does more frequent personnel turnover of personnel affect unit readiness? Third, even if it were found to harm individual productivity or unit readiness, are there ways in which frequent movement might in fact contribute to better overall readiness?
Frequency of Movement and Individual Job Performance
On the first question, the economic theory of human capital suggests that productivity increases (but at a decreasing rate) with experience in doing a job or task. Some human capital is general: skills learned on one job are fully transferrable to other jobs. In this case, productivity does not diminish when individuals change jobs. Other human capital is specific: the skills learned in one job cannot be transferred to other jobs.
In this case, productivity may diminish when job changes occur and individuals require a learning period before becoming fully productive in their new jobs.
If we think of each military assignment or billet as a different job, the key issue here is the extent to which skills that are acquired on one assignment are transferrable to other assignments. To the extent that skills are assignment-specific, a learning period on the new assignment will be necessary f'r individuals to achieve the same productivity as someone else who has the same total military experience, but more time in the current assignment If U skills are in fact assignment-specific, more frequent movement will tend to diminish an individual's performance on a given assignment and therefore detract from overall military effectiveness.
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Accountability incentives is another reason to expect that more frequent rotation diminishes job performance. The more frequently personnel are moved, the less 3 accountable they will be for the future consequences of current decisions they make or actions they take while serving in a given assignment. DoD policy explicitly recognizes the accountability problem in the case of major weapon systems program managers; it may well be a problem elsewhere.
The one factor that tempers the expectation that longer assignments improve 3 productivity or job performance is that excessively long assignments to arduous duty jobs or jobs in undesirable locations may adversely affect job performance as well as retention at I these locations.
Only a handful of studies have attempted to estimate on-the-job learning curves for I military personnel. Kostiuk and Follman (Reference [12] ) analyzed the productivity of Naval Reserve recruiters. Their study is instructive because the output is well-defined and
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can be quantitatively measured, and because recruiter productivity is mostly individual, not team, productivity. They found that (1) among younger recruiters, productivity grows 3 about 67 percent in the first year of recruiting duty and roughly doubles by the third year of recruiting duty, (2) productivity falls, however, just prior to reassignment, and (3) more senior recruiters are immediately more productive than younger recruiters but their productivity does not grow as rapidly with respect to time on recruiting duty. Their results suggest that a significant amount of learning on the job is required before individuals become fully productive in their tasks; however, most of the learning occurs in the first year on the job. Yet recruiting duty is a relatively well-defined task; the time required to achieve a given productivity gain may be longer in more complex assignments.
The second study that estimates the effect of assignment-specific experience was 3 conducted by Quester, Beland, and Mulligan (Reference [ 13] ). These authors estimate the effects of a host of factors on the operational readiness of three classes of Navy destroyers.
3
One important factor is the length of time the commanding officer has been assigned to the ship. For at least one class of ships, they found that the longer the commanding officer has 3 been with the ship, the better is the ship's operational readiness.
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Frequency of Movement and Unit Performance
A second reason for believing that personnel movement affects readiness lies in the fact that much military activity is team-oriented. More frequent personnel turnover diminishes unit effectiveness not only because higher turnover directly diminishes teamwork but also because it requires that more time be devoted to continually orienting and supervising new additions to the unit.
Several studies have attempted to estimate the effect of personnel movement on unit effectiveness. The previously mentioned study of readiness of Navy destroyers (Reference [13] ) included an analysis of the effect of enlisted crew turnover on readiness. In 1988, the crew turnover rate was approximately 40 percent per year (which was down from almost 50 percent in the early 1980s). They found crew turnover to be significantly negatively related to readiness: a I-percentage point decrease in the new crew rate in the quarter prior to a deployment (from a sample mean of 11.8 percent) is estimated to increase the probability that the ship is fully ready at deployment by .02 (from a sample mean of .82 to .84). Importantly, turnover of personnel in grades E-5 and above has a greater impact on readiness than turnover in the lower grades, suggesting that continuity of personnel is especially important in supervisory positions. 6 Scribner, Smith, and Baldwin (Reference [15] ) examined the performance of a large number of Army tank crews on a standardized test range in Germany during JanuaryJune 1984. The score of the crew was significantly related to how long both the tank crew commander and the gunner had been with the crew. They found that a doubling of these crew members' time with the unit (from about 7 to 14 months on average) would increase the tank's test score by about 4 percent, an effect that is small quantitatively albeit statistically significant.
C. CAREER DEVELOPMENT
The above arguments notwithstanding, many in the services believe that in some circumstances more frequent rotation, especially among officers, enhances effectiveness over the long run even when it detracts currently from individual job performance or unit 6 This is an important fimding because turnover of higher grade personnel is more likely to be affected by assignment policy than turnover of junior personnel. Much of the turnover of junior personnel is due to separations resulting from attrition and expiration of enlistments, which cannot be controlled by rotation policy. Marcus (Reference 14) finds that three-fourths of the turnover among careerists is due to normal rotation rather than separation from service. I effectiveness. For example, the evidence from Quester, Beland, and Mulligan indicates that the relatively short ship command tours for Navy officers detract from ship readiness. But the policy of providing a larger number of officers with (short periods of) command experience is believed to contribute to the Navy's mission in two ways: (1) it provides more information to promotion boards about which officers should be promoted to the senior ranks and (2) the policy may improve mobilization capabilities by providing a larger pool of officers trained for command. The latter point suggests that what is inefficient in a strictly peacetime environment may contribute importantly to wartime capabilities.
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D. ASSIGNMENTS, TOUR LENGTHS, MORALE, AND RETENTION m
In addition to the desire to rotate personnel frequently for the purpose of career development, the other important impediment to longer tour lengths is the effect that longer 5 assignments, particularly those in arduous billets or less desirable locations, would have on morale and retention. DoD and service policies that attempt to limit the extent of overseas g duty, and the Navy's attempts to reduce sea duty, are predicated on the belief that morale and retention would suffer if the extent of service in arduous duty billets or undesirable locations were increased. 7 
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To some extent this belief is supported by the existing empirical evidence. Studies of Navy enlisted retention, for instance, have found that a greater fraction of time spent in I sea duty reduces retention (Reference [16) ). Within the Army, personnel in the skillimbalanced MOSs apparently have higher first-term attrition rates and lower frst-term 1 retention rates than personnel in other MOSs. An Army study conducted in the late 1970s found the attrition of first-termers to be positively related to the length of the initial tour to Europe (Reference [17] . 9 The better retention rates of Air Force personnel than Army personnel are consistent with the fact that Air Force personnel generally spend a larger fraction of their time in CONUS. 7 In the context of the above stylized model, increasing to relative to tc without increasing compensation for service in overseas billets would increase b, the separation rate, thereby diving up separation, accession, and training moves.
9 One Army memorandum discussing the skill-imbalanced MOS problem argued that the Army had assigned as many non-MOS-specific CONUS billets as possible to skill-imbalanced MOSs, including recruiter and drill instructor. Unfortunately, many of these CONUS assignments are themselves stressful and tend to exacerbate retention problems in the skill-imbalanced MOSs.
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9 In response to this study, in 1980 the maximum 2-year European tour for first-term Army enlisted personnel was set at 18 months. However, in 1986 the maximum first-term overseas tour length was increased to 24 months.
Yet this research and the anecdotal evidence leave several questions unanswered. For one, the evidence does not make clear whether it is assignment in arduous billets or undesirable locations or just frequent rotation that adversely affects retention. Even when rotation is between comparable billets or locations, more frequent movement is likely to adversely affect retention. One reason is that more frequent rotation hampers the employment and earnings prospects of military spouses. 10 Another is that personnel may not like the family disruptions that accompany frequent moves.
It is likely that much of the adverse morale and retention impact of assignment policy may come from the family separations that accompany certain assignments (e.g., sea duty) rather than to the arduousness of the duty or the undesirability of the location. For example, the historically low retention of enlisted Marine personnel may be traced in part to the fact that much of their overseas duty has been on 1-year unaccompanied tours to East Asia. 11 If the frequency of rotation and the family separations that accompany movement in fact adversely affect retention, a general increase in tour lengths might, for a number of personnel, be viewed positively and have a beneficial impact on morale and retention. This would be particularly true if overseas tours are accompanied and if DoD undertakes to design policies to improve spouse employment opportunities. 12 The fact still remains, however, that the prospect of longer assignments in certain billets could hurt morale and retention.
E. COMPENSATION INCENTIVES
Given the results from the previous subsection, it would seem natural to use compensation to offset the adverse effects of longer service in undesirable billets or locations. But attitudes toward doing so have varied over time (Reference 
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for enlisted personnel was scaled back to 10 percent of basic pay and FDP for officers was eliminated. The 1949 law also set sea pay rates for Navy enlisted personnel equal to the 3 FDP rates. In 1963 eligibility for receipt of FDP was restricted. Relabelled Certain Places Pay (CPP), it is currently paid only to personnel serving at a limited number of "truly arduous" overseas locations. However, Navy enlisted personnel still receive sea pay, and OTEIP, implemented in 1980, provides some compensation for some personnel serving I overseas who extend for 1 full year beyond their normal prescribed tour.
This brief review is instructive because it indicates that during certain times compensation for service in arduous assignments has been considerably more generous I than in the programs that DoD currently has in place. Would an expansion of these programs to the more generous benefit levels that have prevailed historically encourage 5 personnel to accept or to stay longer in hard-to-fill billets? Would an expansion be costeffective?
Sea Pay
The sea pay program provides Navy enlisted personnel varying amounts of sea pay based on cumulative years of sea duty. In addition, a $100 per month "kicker" is provided to personnel who have currently served in more than 3 years in a sea billet. A number of I studies have examined the sea duty problem. They are reviewed by Cooke ( Reference  [19] ). The focus of these studies has been the effect on retention of sea duty and3 compensation, including both sea pay and reenlistment bonuses. The consensus estimate is that a 10-percent increase in the extent of sea duty in the next term of service reduces Navy first-term enlisted retention by about 3.5 percent. Consequently, the first-term retention rate will be about 10 percent lower in ratings that spend 4 out of every 6 years at sea compared with ratings that spend 3 out of every 6 years at sea.
The impact of sea pay on retention has been hard to establish for the reason that sea pay rates have not varied much historically and, despite a sizeable increase in 1980, still comprise only a small proportion of Basic Military Compensation (BMC). The only study that has attempted to estimate the effect of sea pay was by Radtke (Reference [20] ), whose I results were, on the whole, not very precise. The effects of reenlistment bonuses have been estimated much more precisely. The adverse effect of a 10-percent increase in the 5 extent of sea duty could be overcome by a one to two multiple increase in the Selective
I
Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), which translates to a pay increase of about 6 to 12 percent over the horizon of a reenlistment.
To date, no studies of sea pay have successfully analyzed the issue of whether the $100 monthly increment in sea pay at 3 years of consecutive service has been effective in encouraging personnel to extend in sea billets. However, anecdotal evidence indicates that the Navy has had much less difficulty filling sea billets during the 1980s than it did during the late 1970s, when sea pay and reenlistment bonuses were considerably lower. Calculations by Goldberg (Reference [21] ) and Warner and Goldberg (Reference [16] ) indicate that the higher sea pay or reenlistment bonuses are a more cost-effective way of filling sea billets than by the increase in endstrength that would be required to provide the rotation base necessary to fully man sea billets without higher pay levels for sea-intensive skills.
The Overseas Tour Extension Incentive Program
The OTEIP is the primary compensation incentive offered to Army and Air Force enlisted personnel to extend overseas tours. A 1987 DoD report (Reference [3] ) examined the OTEIP in some detail. Data from FY 1986 on the number of OTEIP participants, their participation as a percentage of those eligible to participate, and the frequency of options chosen are displayed in Table 5 . Participation in the OTEIP is low-with the exception of the Navy, less than 10 percent of the personnel eligible to receive OTEIP benefits receive them. According to the DoD study, this program provides a substantial "windfall" to program participants because many of them would have extended their overseas tours in the absence of the program. The report cites results of an econometric analysis of Air Force data, which I indicates that the OTEIP has increased overseas tour extensions by about 25 percent,
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suggesting a windfall rate of 75 percent. 13 If this is so, at current benefit levels OTEIP induces only about two or three 1-year extensions for each 100 persons eligible to extend.
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The rather high windfall rate reduces the cost-effectiveness of the program. However, a detailed cost analysis provided in the DoD found that although the windfall rate is high, OTEIP has essentially no impact on the PCS budget. It saves just enough money in reduced frequency of PCS moves to pay the OTEIP benefits. The report concludes that "OTEIP has little potential for reducing PCS costs in expanded or alternative forms" I (Reference [3], p. 18) . However, the report recommends changing Option A from 12 monthly payments of $80 to a single lump-sum of $1,000 to be paid at the time the member 3 extends on grounds that this change would "increase program participation and reduce the percentage of windfall participants at no additional cost to the government" (Reference 
19).
The econometric analysis of OTEIP probably overstates the windfall effect of the program. While the report never defines exactly what constitutes an extension, it apparently considers an extension any tour length in excess of the PTL. But many of the extensions that do not involve receipt of OTEIP benefits are likely to be for periods of less than 1 year. Because receipt of OTEIP benefits requires an extension of at least 1 year and therefore would not be paid to short extensions, it is likely that the windfall rate estimated by the study is overstated and, consequently, that the savings in PCS costs are understated. Even if it is cost-neutral, OTEIP is beneficial because it does increase the number of personnel willing to extend for longer overseas tours. Longer overseas tours save money by reducing the number of CONUS billets required for rotational purposes. Furthermore, by avoiding the involuntary reassignment of personnel, the program is likely to have a positive (albeit perhaps small) effect on retention. However, further analysis is required to determine how many additional man-months of overseas service are actually purchased I with this program. 13 The econometric method is described in the report, but actual parameter estimates and significance levels are not reported. Linear probability models were estimated with grouped data and with individual I data. The proportion extending or a binary variable for extension is regressed on a number of independent variables, one of which is a dummy variable for whether the individual is in an occupation that is eligible for OTEIP benefits. The coefficient on this dummy is (apparently) interpreted as the change in the extension rate due to the existence of the program.
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